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I. INTRODUCTION
More than fifty years after Gideon v. Wainright,' the theoretical
commitment to the right to counsel remains strong. However, the reality of
that right is far more complex. Not so long ago, the notion that every
criminal defendant whether in state or federal court was entitled to the
Margareth Etienne, Associate Dean and Professor of Law, and Nancy Snowden
Research Scholar, University of Illinois at Urban-Champaign. Special thanks to the editors and
participants of the University of South Carolina Law Review Symposium, "Reform: The Past,
Present and Future of Criminal Sentencing." In particular, I would like to thank John Blume,
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contributions.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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provision of counsel at critical stages of criminal proceedings was a
revolutionary one.2 Even after Gideon was decided, the common
understanding of what it meant to be protected by counsel extended only to
conviction or to the guilt or innocence of a defendant.3 Stated differently,
counsel was meant to protect against a false or unjust conviction that could
result from trial, not necessarily from sentencing. The notion that ineffective
assistance would lead to an unconstitutional sentence, outside the death
penalty context, was not fully accepted as long as that sentence was within
the statutory or guideline range.4 After all, the court is generally responsible
for sentencing and, as such, can mitigate any prejudice resulting from the
inadequate representation by an attorney.
This view of the defense lawyer's role in plea and sentencing
negotiation was revised in Missouri v. Frye6 and its companion case, Lafler
v. Cooper.7 In these cases, the Supreme Court declared the importance of the
right to counsel in the plea bargaining context, and-by extension to the
sentencing context.8 Cases like Frye and Lafler further solidified in the
American psyche the perception that the accused has a fundamental "right to
a lawyer."9 However, declaring a right to counsel in plea bargaining is
nearly meaningless if the administration or enforcement of that right has no
force. Bill Stuntz famously argued that landmark criminal procedure cases
that bestow or confirm important rights to criminal defendants can be
substantially defanged when they face structural challenges of
enforcement.0 Put another way, checks and balances between governmental
branches can work to either enhance or derail the work of one branch.
2. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-89 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)) ("We have recognized that the 'core purpose' of the
counsel guarantee is to assure aid at trial, 'when the accused [is] confronted with both the
intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor."').
4. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment o Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 111, 152 (2007) ("Death
sentences may well demand 'super due process,' but other sentences surely demand much
more than the virtual blank check issued by the Supreme Court to the legislatures.").
5. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. Rev.
1069 (2009) ("Courts have repeatedly intimated that standards should be different, referencing
gate-keeping concerns and noting that discretionary sentencing is not necessarily a formal
adversarial proceeding.").
6. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
7. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
8. Id. at 1388; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
9. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399.
10. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 52 (1997).
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Enforcement of the judiciary's rulings can be "checked" or thwarted by the
other governmental branches. The legislative branch can effectively limit the
right to counsel-for example by underfunding indigent attorneys."
Similarly, the executive branch can render the right to trial meaningless
when its prosecutors place unconscionable trial penalties on those who
choose to exercise the right and unconscionable appeal waivers on those
who do not.
Indeed, some Supreme Court cases designed to protect the rights of the
accused can become so co-opted as to have the opposite effect. Here,
Miranda v. Arizonal2 comes to mind. Perhaps the best and most widely
discussed example of the difficulties inherent in administering the right to
counsel is the development of the Miranda warnings. The warnings were
viewed by the Miranda Court and its supporters as a prophylactic and
necessary corollary to the right to counsel itself. 13 The now ubiquitous
warnings have become an important tool in law enforcement
interrogations.14 Miranda stands as a testament o the challenges we face in
making the right to counsel meaningful "on the ground" and given the
realities of the context in which it is exercised.
In this Article, I consider the realities of administering the right to
counsel in the context of plea bargaining and sentencing. I consider how the
right to effective counsel in plea bargaining has fared since the Supreme
Court's announcement in Frye and Lafler and what this means for
sentencing jurisprudence and reform. Students of Frye, Lafler, and the right
to counsel cases that have followed them in the lower courts must weigh
how these rulings have been applied and constrained by the defense and
prosecuting attorneys, as well as by other decision makers charged with their
regulation of an adversarial process for which effective representation is
critical.
11. Id.atO-13.
12. 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966) ("In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not
presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege
against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that
any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed.").
13. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) ("But we are unwilling
to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might
want a lawyer."); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988) ("[T]he key inquiry in a
case such as this one must be: Was the accused, who waived his Sixth Amendment rights
during post indictment questioning, made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel
present during the questioning, and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid
of counsel?"); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 ("More important, such a warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.").
14. See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 16-17 (discussing the importance of Miranda and
constitutional criminal procedure in policing).
2017] 469
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I proceed in three parts. In Part II, I examine the Frye and Lafler cases
and analyze their depiction of the right to effective assistance in the context
of pleas and sentences. This necessarily requires an analysis of Strickland"
and the application of the Strickland factors to the sentence imposed. Part of
the determination of whether a defendant has been harmed or prejudiced by
ineffective representation assumes some agreement about the sentence that
would be appropriate or "reasonable" under the circumstances. Therefore,
Part II addresses the question of the effectively counseled sentence. This
turns out to be a nearly impossible question, but its dissection reveals an
important challenge for understanding effectiveness in sentencing. Part III
considers structural challenges to the right to counsel at sentencing.
Sometimes a defendant receives ineffective assistance because her attorney
is bad, careless, overworked or unknowledgeable. But oftentimes,
structural impediments placed by other decision makers such as prosecutors,
probation officers or legislators render otherwise capable lawyers
ineffective.'7 In Part IV, I explore examples of some of these impediments
and their implications for sentencing reform. Finally, I conclude with a
discussion of the challenges in regulating and administering the right to a
well-counseled sentence or sentencing deal.
II. UNDERSTANDING FRYE AND LAFLER AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN
NEGOTIATING SENTENCES
Let us divide the right to counsel cases into two categories. First, there
are those cases, like Gideon, that establish the existence of the right to
counsel in new contexts or in particular situations. The famous juvenile
criminal law case of In re Gault" is a notable example. In Gault, fifteen-
year old Gerald Gault was placed in custody for six years after being
adjudicated a "juvenile delinquent" for making lewd telephone calls.19
Without the benefit of due process or an attorney, the juvenile court judge-
acting in loco parentis-declared that Gerald be committed to Arizona's
State Industrial School until the age of majority.20 The Supreme Court held
15. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
16. See generally Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 682-83 (2007)
(stating that ineffective representation is rampant largely due to overworked lawyers).
17. Id at 688 (stating that some jurisdictions have fee caps that create a financial
incentive to quickly resolve cases in order to move on to the next case).
18. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. Id at 7-8, 16.
20. Id at 41-42.
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that the juvenile proceeding was rendered defective by the failure of the
juvenile court to inform Gerald and his parents of their right to the assistance
of counsel.21 Gerald and his parents should have been informed of Gerald's
right to an attorney and should have been provided an attorney if the family
22was unable to afford one. The Court rejected the then common notion that
Gerald's rights could be sufficiently protected by his parents, the probation
23officer, and the judge. Thus, In re Gault confirmed that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel in fact did apply to a juvenile proceeding
because juvenile adjudications carry the "awesome prospect of incarceration
in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21.",24 Prior to
Gault, it was presumed that the right to counsel did not apply to juveniles in
delinquency proceedings. Thus, Gault falls in the first category of the right
25to counsel cases.
The second category of the right to counsel cases are those in which the
contours of the right are defined. The Supreme Court presumed, well before
Gideon, that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is
26meaningless if that assistance is ineffective. For instance in Powell v.
Alabama, the Court held that the mere appointment of counsel without
providing the defendant adequate opportunity to consult and have effective
aid of counsel would have resulted in a constitutional violation comparable
27to the complete failure to provide counsel. The Court in Powell did not
establish the right to counsel; instead, the Court further clarified the question
of what constitutes "effectiveness."
Since Gideon, both state and federal courts have had to weigh in on
21what constitutes ineffective assistance in various situations. Judges varied
21. Id.
22. Id. at 41-42.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 36-37.
25. See id at 35-36 (citing Arizona State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249
(1956)) (discussing the former view that due process did not require juveniles to have a right to
counsel).
26. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (holding that the right to
assistance of counsel requires, at a minimum, that the defendant is not appointed an attorney
with a conflict of interest); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932) (discussing the
importance of effective aid of counsel in a capital case).
27. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71-72 ("[I]t is the duty of the court, whether requested or
not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is
not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the
giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.").
28. See, e.g., Marzullo v. State of Md., 561 F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating the
"farce and mockery of justice" test is no longer applicable post-Gideon); Com. v. Jones, 371
2017] 471
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in their approaches until the Supreme Court declared the now well-
established test for ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v.
Washington.29 The Strickland test has two parts. First, the attorney's
performance must be deficient, even when examined with great deference to
attorney strategy and without the benefit of hindsight.3 0 Second, the deficient
performance must lead to results sufficiently harmful to the defendant as to
undermine the confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.3' The
defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."3 2
The second category of post-Gideon right to counsel cases-those
defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel-far outnumber the
first category of cases-those establishing the existence of the right. The
Supreme Court recently heard two cases, Missouri v. Frye33 and Lafler v.
Cooper,34 in the right to counsel line of cases. Both cases have been heralded
(and critiqued) as establishing a new right to counsel in the context of plea
negotiations.35 But some commentators counter that the cases merely help
define effectiveness of counsel in advising defendants regarding sentencing
36and charge offers.
A.2d 874, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (examining the appropriate standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel).
29. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
3 0. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 694.
33. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (establishing that the existence of the right
to counsel extends to the plea context).
34. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (establishing that faulty advice from
counsel is a violation of the Sixth Amendment).
35. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process:
Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 457, 461 (2013) (examining best
practices in the plea bargaining context after Frye and Lafler); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea
Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2669 (2013) (critiquing the establishment of the
right to counsel in plea negotiations).
36. See, e.g., Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The Constitutional Right to
Defense Counsel Who Plea Bargains, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 121, 148-52 (2014) ("[T]he
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel requires not that the
prosecutor offer the defendant a plea, but that when it is in the defendant's best interests and he
wishes to plead guilty, defense counsel affirmatively attempts to obtain a beneficial plea
agreement from the prosecutor."); Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent
Counsel after Cooper and Frye: Is the Supreme Court Making the Ordinary Criminal Process
"Too Long, Too Expensive, and Unpredictable ... in Pursuit of Perfect Justice"?, 51 DUQ. L.
REv. 735, 747-48 (2013) (discussing how Frye and Lafler only define what effectiveness of
counsel is).
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In Frye, Galin Frye faced his fourth charge of driving with a revoked
license.37 His repeat offender status permitted the state of Missouri to charge
him with a felony offense carrying the potential of a four-year sentence.38
The prosecutor conveyed an expiring plea offer of ninety-days to Frye's
attorney, but the attorney never communicated the offer.39 The expiration
date on the offer elapsed, and in the interim Frye was arrested once again for
driving with a revoked license.40 Frye's eventual plea without a negotiated
plea deal in place-resulted in a three-year sentence.41 The Supreme Court
found that Frye's lawyer's failure to timely inform him of the state's plea
offer violated Frye's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.42 The Court held
"that, as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal
offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused."43
In the companion case of Lafler v. Cooper,44 defendant Cooper received
ludicrously faulty advice from his attorney in the context of considering a
plea offer.45 Cooper faced charges for several violent offenses, including
46assault with the intent to murder. The underlying facts suggested that
Cooper fired several shots at a woman. As the victim attempted to flee,
Cooper chased and managed to shoot her four times, hitting her in the hip,
abdomen and buttocks.4 7 Cooper confessed his guilt to the court and his
desire to plead guilty.48 His attorney persuaded him that he had a viable trial
defense: that the failure to shoot the victim above the waist could establish
the defendant's lack of intent to murder.49 Cooper thus rejected a plea offer
of four to seven years and was sentenced following trial to the mandatory
minimum of fifteen to thirty years.50 Cooper argued that his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. The
Supreme Court agreed.5
37. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1404-05.
40. Id. at 1404.
41. Id. at 1404-05.
42. Id. at 1408-09.
43. Id. at 1408.
44. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).






51. Id at 1391.
2017] 473
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Frye and Lafler have been simultaneously lauded and criticized as an
important departure from established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.52
Justice Scalia, in dissent, criticized the majority for opening "a whole new
field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law."53 How
"new" or revolutionary the Frye and Lafler holdings are depend in part on
whether they are viewed as belonging to the first category of right to counsel
cases or the second. Do they establish a new right to counsel or recognize an
entirely new context in which the Sixth Amendment right to an attorney
ought to be recognized? Alternatively, do they further define the contours or
expected behavior of a previously recognized right?
A. The Right to Counsel in this Context is Not New
The notion that criminal defendants have a right to effective
representation during plea bargaining is simply not novel.54  Some
commentators have explained that they were only surprised "that there were
four dissents"55 or that this obvious pronouncement "took so long"'56 to
make. Shortly after Gideon, the Supreme Court decided in McMann v.
Richardson that a defendant who was "incompetently advised by his
attorney" could collaterally attack his state guilty plea in federal court if he
could show that his decision to plead was based on the faulty advice he
received.7 Such a showing would render his plea involuntary under Jackson
52. Kimberly Atkins, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia: Court Gave "Guilty"
Defendants Right to "Escape a Fair Trial", LAW. WKLY USA, March 22, 2012; Editorial, A
Broader Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012 ("The court has strengthened that right,
and improved American justice, by applying it to the entire plea-bargaining process."); Mark
Govaki, Court Adds Plea Guard; New Extra Step Ensures the Defendant Understands Plea
Deal. Move Meant to Prevent Costly Appeals and Save Taxpayers Money, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, May 21, 2012; Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Right ofAccused in Plea Bargains, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012 ("Stephanos Bibas, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania
and an authority on plea bargaining, said the decisions were a great step forward. But he
acknowledged that it may give rise to gamesmanship."); Alex G. Philipson, Commentary,
Supreme Court Expands 6th Amendment Rights in Plea Bargaining, R.I. LAW. WKLY, March
29, 2012 ("As with other fundamental shifts in the law, such as the sea change in confrontation
clause jurisprudence brought about by Crawford v. Washington, the Frye and Lafler decisions
present a host of difficult and unanswered questions sure to keep prosecutors and defense
attorneys busy for some time.").
53. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
54. See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 39
(2012) ("The decisions do not represent a novelty in the law.
5 5. Id.
56. Norman L. Reimer, Frye and Lafler: Much Ado about What We Do-and What
Prosecutors and Judges Should Not Do, 36 CHAMPION 7, 7 (Apr. 2012).
57. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970).
474 [VOL. 68: 467
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v. Denno. To succeed, the defendant is required to "demonstrate gross
error on the part of counsel when he recommended that the defendant plead
guilty instead of going to trial." 59 The Court affirmed the McMann analysis
again in Tollett v. Henderson,60 where it explained that a defendant "may
only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by
showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the
standards set forth in McMann. Interestingly, McMann and Tollet do not
rely directly on Gideon and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but rather
on Denno and the more general right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment.62
Later in Hill v. Lockhart, the Court was explicit that an attorney's advice
in the context of plea bargaining was a Sixth Amendment violation under
Gideon and Strickland.63
Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington dealt with a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing
proceeding, and was premised in part on the similarity between such
a proceeding and the usual criminal trial, the same two-part standard
seems to us applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of
the plea process. Certainly our justifications for imposing the
"prejudice" requirement in Strickland v. Washington are also
64relevant in the context of guilty pleas.
Moreover, the expectation that attorneys owe their clients effective
representation at every stage of the criminal process is certainly not news to
65most criminal defense lawyers. As noted by Norman Reimer, Executive
Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, "[flor as
long as plea offers have a been a feature of criminal practice, responsible
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
61. 1d. at 267.
62. See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (stating that it was error for
the trial judge to not require an affirmative showing that the plea satisfied Fifth Amendment
protections regarding confessions); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962)
("A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a
voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral attack.");
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1927) ("Out of just consideration for
persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless
made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.").
63. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
64. Id. at 57.
65. Reimer, supra note 56.
2017] 475
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and competent lawyers have recognized a responsibility to tell their clients
of the offer and do their best to accurately advise on the pros and cons."66 As
Reimer explains, this duty of effective assistance during the plea negotiation
and decision making process has long been squarely recognized by the
67 61American Bar Association. The Frye Court made the same observations.
Moreover, at least ten federal circuit courts had already held that plea
bargaining is a critical phase of the criminal process during which
defendants have a constitutional Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance.69
B. A New Reading ofPrejudicefor Pleas under Strickland
In merely applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the plea
bargaining context, Frye and Lafler do not create a new field of law or
constitutional cause of action.70 Yet, there was something remarkable about
the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Frye and Lafler. When considered
in the context of the Strickland category of cases, they do represent a
departure from the traditional Strickland analysis of cases in one critical
manner.
The well-established Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel
has two prongs.7 ' The first prong of Strickland deficient attorney
performance-is easily met, indeed conceded in Frye and Lafler.72 The
second prong of Strickland evidence that the defendant was harmed or
prejudiced by the deficiency is more complicated in the sentencing context
here than in most other plea or trial cases in which the finding of guilt is the
6 6. Id.
67. Id. (citing, inter alia, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION
& DEF. FUNCTION 4-5.1(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1993); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.,
PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(f) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1999)).
68. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
69. See Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1090 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Mathis, 503 F.3d 150, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 497-
500 (7th Cir. 2007); Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 370 n.7 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Merritt, 102 Fed. App'x 303, 307 (4th Cir. 2004); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045,
1054-56 (9th Cir. 2003); Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v.
Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376,
380-81 (2d Cir. 1998); Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1995)).
70. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1402 (noting the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel extends to the plea bargaining context); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384
(2012) (explaining the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to
plea offers).
71. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
72. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1402; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1380.
476 [VOL. 68: 467
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central harm. To show prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must
demonstrate that the attorney's deficiency was "so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."73 Frye did not go to
trial but Cooper, the Lafler defendant, did.74 Frye did not contest the
reliability of the judgment of guilt that was entered based on his plea. Earlier
plea cases Strickland itself being an example of this-involved pleas that
were tainted by forced confessions or other unreliable evidence. In other
words, they dealt with arguably innocent defendants who were wrongfully
convicted based on ill-advised decisions to plead guilty. Having admitted to
the crime, Cooper did not allege that the trial was unfair, that it violated his
due process rights, or that the guilty verdict was unreliable.
Many plea cases involve defendants who accepted plea agreements
improvidently (based on deficient legal communication or advice) and thus
lost opportunities for fair trial; Frye and Lafler involve the failure to accept
plea agreements (based on deficient legal communication or advice) that
would have led to more favorable sentences but that did not undermine the
reliability of their convictions. The Frye Court recognized this anomaly
and noted that many rejected pleas-an important element of a system that is
based predominantly on guilty pleas-could not be adequately scrutinized
under the strict adherence to the Strickland test's second prong.78 According
to Justice Kennedy, given the centrality of plea bargaining in the pretrial
process to the ultimate result of the proceedings, "it is insufficient simply to
point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors
in the pretrial process."79
So how do Frye, Lafler, and Strickland work together to enhance our
understanding of the right to trial in the context of negotiated sentencing?
Instead of defining prejudice by the reliability of the conviction result, as in
the context of a lapsed, uncommunicated, or deficiently counseled plea offer,
the Court finds prejudice where there is "a reasonable probability that the
end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason
of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time."80 Under this
standard, the Frye and Lafler majorities had little difficulty determining
73. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
74. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1401 (noting the defendant pled guilty); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at
1380 (noting the defendant went to trial).
75. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406.
76. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383 (noting defendant argued his attorney's advice to
reject the plea deal amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel).
77. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1400; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1379.
78. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
79. Id.
80. Id at 1409.
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prejudice.8 Ultimately what is "new" here according to sentencing scholar
Nancy King is that "[n]o [earlier] decision of the Supreme Court had held
that the Sixth Amendment protected defendants from losing plea deals, as
opposed to fair trials, sentencing proceedings, or appeals."82 Because plea
deals are predominantly about the substance of sentences, the right to
counsel during pleas is largely about the right to effective sentencing
agreements.
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING SENTENCING HARM IN PLEA BARGAINING
The right to counsel during plea negotiations is critical to sentencing
reform because pleas are an essential element of our criminal justice system.
As the Frye Court made plain, "plea bargaining is ... not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."83 In other
words, if plea bargaining were exempt from the Sixth Amendment
guarantee, this would emphatically limit the reach of the Sixth Amendment.
Lafler and Frye provide examples of ways in which ineffective attorneys can
impede their clients from taking advantage of plea agreements.84 In one case
the attorney fails to inform the client of the opportunity, and in the other, the
attorney counsels the client against a plea. In both cases, the plea offer is
the opportunity, and the harm is the defendant's lost opportunity to reduce
his sentence.
This reading would have great potential for meaningful sentencing
reform or reducing over-incarceration if there were much evidence that
defendants frequently or even regularly forego favorable plea agreements.
There is certainly evidence that this occurs, leading to tragic results.
81. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
82. Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper andAEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29, 31 (2012).
83. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
84. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1402 (noting the defendant's attorney deficiently let the plea
offer expire); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1380 (explaining the defendant rejected the plea offer upon
the advice of his attorney).
85. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (noting the defendant's attorney failed to inform the
defendant of the plea offers prior to their expiration); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383 (noting the
defendant's lawyer counseled him to reject the plea offer).
86. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404-05; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1380.
87. One scholar, and former public defender, argues that harried, overworked, or
incompetent lawyers fail to present their clients with favorable plea offers all over the country.
See Vida B. Johnson, A Plea For Funds: Using Padilla, Lafler, and Frye to Increase Public
Defender Resources, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 403, 405 (2014). She explains that:
Because defense lawyers are so busy, they often spend more time on cases
478 [VOL. 68: 467
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Nonetheless, far more evidence suggests that defendants plead guilty at
overwhelming rates, largely with the advice of counsel. Accordingly, it is
far more likely that attorney error or effectiveness would occur in the vast
majority of cases where attorneys recommend pleas rather than in the few
cases that attorneys recommend against them. Yet, this raises difficulties for
the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the pleas and sentencing context.
How might we measure the harm to the defendant who improvidently
accepts a plea offer?
As long as we measure the "harm" of the plea decision to take or
reject a plea offer-against the sentence the defendant would have received
without the plea, it will be nearly impossible to find prejudice or harm under
Strickland. There are several reasons for this.
1. Overcharging
In most instances, the baseline analysis for measuring prejudice would
depend on the sentence to which the defendant was exposed absent the plea
offer.89 The practice of prosecutorial overcharging renders this baseline false
and artificially inflated.90 In a recent essay, Kyle Graham differentiates
between several types of prosecutorial practices:
[T]he term "overcharging" can communicate three different
criticisms of prosecutorial practices. The first approach toward
"overcharging" objects to the allegation of crimes without adequate
proof. A second criticism resembles the first in that it maps criminal
charges against some standard of propriety, but differs in that it is
concerned with a lack of proportionality between the nature or
consequences of the charges in a case on the one hand, and the
seriousness of the defendant's alleged misconduct on the other.
they believe are destined for trial than on those that are likely to plead out.
Attorneys sometimes fail to get plea offers to their indigent clients before they
expire, and more frequently fail to provide their clients with the information
necessary to make intelligent, informed decisions about whether to plead guilty or
go to trial. Id.
88. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (noting the majority of federal and state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas).
89. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (explaining that to measure prejudice, the defendant
must show the sentence under the plea offer's terms would have been less severe than the
sentence that was imposed).
90. See Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 703 (2014) (defining
overcharging as a type of plea bargaining in which prosecutors agree to dismiss or reduce
charges in exchange for a guilty plea).
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Finally, a third conception of overcharging also attacks a lack of
proof or proportionality, but only when a prosecutor has framed
charges with an eye toward dismissing or reducing some or all of
them as part of a plea bargain. The differences among these
definitions matter, especially because some perceived solutions to
overcharging address only one or two of these critiques.91
For the purposes of assessing defense attorney advice in plea
negotiations, all of these versions of overcharging are relevant. In his
dissenting opinion in Lafler, Justice Scalia recognized the practice of
92prosecutorial overcharging as a possible element of plea bargaining. When
a prosecutor levies a charge that is higher than she reasonably expects to
obtain-either because she lacks the evidence or because the sentence is
disproportional to the "market rate" for the offense-and does so only to
secure a plea or penalize those who exercise the trial right, the inflated
sentence that would result in absence of a plea offer does not provide a
useful baseline.
2. Trial Penalty
Even absent overcharging, any recommendation to take a plea offer
could be portrayed as more "effective" advice than a recommendation
against a plea offer. Indeed, because judges themselves often levy a trial
penalty over defendants even when there is no plea deal, a lawyer's
recommendation to her client to accept responsibility and take a blind or
unnegotiated plea will be difficult to challenge under the Sixth Amendment.
A challenged lawyer can, in most cases, respond with the truism of the trial
penalty: the fact that defendants who plead guilty receive lower sentences
than defendants who go to trial, even taking into account the severity of their
cnmes.93
91. Id. at 702.
92. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing that plea bargaining
"presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense").
93. See Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal
Criminal Courts, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 446 (2004) (discussing how the appeal rate of criminal
cases implicates a "key difference between defendants who [plea] to get acceptance versus
those who [plea] to get a plea bargain").
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3. The Harm of an Ill-Advised Plea Deal
What about the "harm" that results from a lack of zealous representation
on behalf of the client? How can Lafler and Frye help us assess the danger
of taking a "bad" or overcharged plea? Of failing to investigate the case? Of
giving up too soon?94 By focusing only on plea offers that were not
consummated, as opposed to those pleas that were improvidently taken, the
Supreme Court lost an opportunity for ushering an era of more significant
reform. The Court had already considered ill-advised pleas under the Sixth
Amendment in context of assessing the harm of plea versus trial.95 Before
Lafler and Frye, cases like Padilla96 and Lockhart97 offered some sense of
this question. What those cases lacked and what the Supreme Court could
have done in Lafler and Frye is offer a more expansive view of how "harm"
and "prejudice" might be viewed in the context of "plea" versus "plea" or of
evaluating pleas generally.
IV. A NARROW VIEW OF SENTENCING "HARM"
The remedy authorized by the Court in the instance of ill-advised or
uncommunicated guilty pleas based on attorneys' deficient performance is
simple. First, defense attorneys must communicate plea offers to their clients
within a reasonable amount of time.98 In addition, a defense lawyer's
inaccurate advice to her client should not cause the defendant to forgo a
more favorable sentencing outcome. In each of these examples, the
defendant faces a sentencing "harm" that is recognized under Strickland. In
each of those cases, if the defense lawyer's act or omission did not occur, the
defendant would have fared better.99 But there are many more contexts in
which a lawyer might be ineffective in the plea negotiation context. Some of
94. Federal Judge Rakoff considers this possibility as a potential downside to the Frye
and Lafler decisions. See Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122
YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 26 (2012) (noting how Frye and Lafler "do nothing" to address the
"result of overconfidence" of prosecutors).
95. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
9 6. Id.
97. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
98. Even absent these constitutional rulings, most attorneys would view this as ethically
or professionally mandated. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N
2011) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.").
99. For instance, as the Supreme Court articulated in Hill v. Lockhart, the defendant had
to show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
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these are a result of bad lawyering and others are forced errors in lawyering.
Unfortunately, a narrow view of harm limits the potential for sentencing
reform.
What if there was a recognized view of harm that took into account what
might be affirmatively required for effectively negotiating a plea or
sentence? The National Legal Aid and Defender Association encourages
defense attorneys to consider a wide range of factors in advising their clients
regarding pleas.'00 These include the collateral consequences of convictions,
such as deportation, possible sentence enhancements, the rules regarding
supervision, parole and "good time credit" that would impact the sentence,
factors about the nature and location of confinement, and any other benefits
the client could seek.'0'
In Lafler, Cooper's lawyer recommended against a plea offer that would
have reduced his sentence significantly.102 Cooper's lawyer's advice was
based on misinformation about the law and about the legal inferences to be
drawn from the uncontested evidence in the case.103 The difference between
Cooper's exposure under the plea agreement versus the mandatory minimum
he faced after conviction under the charged offense was eight years at a
* * * 104*
minimum and twenty-six years at a maximum. There is no explanation
provided in the case for the lawyer's gross error. Yet, one can imagine
several situations in which a lawyer would give "harmful" advice for other
reasons.
1. Exploding or "Take it or Leave it" Plea Offers
Prosecutors have long offered plea deals in order to reduce their trial
case loads. o0 Defendants are given a choice between exercising their right to
trial and waiving that right in exchange for a lesser charge and a lower
sentence. Encouraging pleas is a mainstay of the American prosecutorial
practice. Studies estimate that approximately ninety to ninety-five percent of
100. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEF. REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (2011).
101. Id
102. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
103. Id
104. Id
105. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 261, 263 (2011)
("Excessive caseloads lead to long backlogs in court settings, including trials, and bottom-line
plea bargain offers.").
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state and federal criminal cases are resolved by plea bargaining. o0 However,
it has become increasingly common practice in state and federal
prosecutorial offices not only to entice pleas but to entice them quickly.
For example, one district attorney in Louisiana instituted a new strategy
of offering "one time only" or "take it or leave it deals."0 7 In another
example, one defendant in the District of New Jersey was provided with a
written plea offer on December 12 that expired if not executed by a
December 23 deadline. os While plea deadlines are not necessarily coercive,
in some instances, prosecutors are offering these deals prior to turning over
discovery or other valuable evidence in the case.109 Even when the
defendant's counsel has received discovery, there might not be enough time
to review it or to independently investigate the case. Without this valuable
evidence or an opportunity to investigate the case on their own, defense
lawyers cannot adequately assess the strength of the government's case and
make an informed recommendation regarding a plea.
The practice of exploding offers with unreasonably short deadlines is on
the rise in federal and state courts.' 1 Prosecutors often time the deadlines for
the acceptance of the plea not based on the amount of time needed to
adequately asses the case but on external factors that could impact their
workload."' For instance, a deadline might occur before a grand jury
indictment or before a response is due on a motion to suppress
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
2. Heavy Caseloads and Other Time Pressures
Like prosecutors, defense lawyers often work under heavy caseloads
and have incredible pressures on their time. Many lawyers engage in a sort
of triage to determine which of their cases can be easily resolved and which
106. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1989, (Timothy J. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire, eds., 1990).
107. John Simmerman, Take-It-Or-Leave-It Plea Deals: New Strategy by Orleans Parish
District Attorney, TIMES PICAYUNE (July 2, 2012), http://nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/07/
take-it-or-leave-itplea deals.html.
108. Plea Offer Letter from Paul J. Fishman, U.S. Att'y, to Timothy R. Anderson,
Esquire (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/file/814376/download.
109. Id.
110. See generally, Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining, Just as it Ever Was?, 10 OHIO ST J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 1 (2012) ("'Take it or leave it"' offers and deadlines to accept the deal are
common.").
111. See generally, Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 105, at 262-65 (stating that
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ones will justifiably require more time. Lawyers risk providing ineffective
assistance when they are required to make hasty triage or plea
recommendations.
Implicit in Frye is the assumption that the lawyer did not communicate
the plea deal in a timely fashion and that the defendant was not able to make
an informed decision.112 While that may have been the case in Frye, in other
cases, a court may have to determine what amount of time is required in a
more complex case for a lawyer to adequately advise a defendant regarding
a plea. Frye involved the repeated offense of driving on a suspended license,
therefore, the Court provided little guidance on how a more complicated
charge might alter the attorney's obligations.
3. Overemphasis on Offense Characteristics
A defense lawyer has the r sponsibility to learn as much about the case
as possible and as much about the law as possible before she can effectively
counsel her client regarding a plea."3 But the defense lawyer also needs time
to learn about her client. Are there facts about the client's history,
employment, skills, and mental health that should justifiably influence the
decision to take a plea? Are there considerations about the context or
circumstances surrounding the offense that even the most generous
discovery file will not reveal?
The narrow approach to our understanding of effective plea advice is
overly concerned with the attorney's assessment of the offense rather than
the "offender" characteristics. This is critical because plea agreements in the
state courts often require an agreement or stipulation regarding a specific
sentence or sentencing range. In federal courts, plea agreements commonly
prevent the defense attorney from seeking a departure or variance from the
calculated sentencing range. Attorneys can at the very least argue in favor of
mitigation under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) factors, but this requires knowledge
of the defendant that may take time to develop. Some considerations under
3553(a)(1) include the lack of youthful guidance, physical condition, good
112. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012) ("Frye's attorney did not advise Frye
that the offers had been made. The offers expired."). The Missouri Court of Appeals stated,
"Frye testified at the post-conviction hearing that his post-conviction counsel sent him a copy
of the Offer while he was incarcerated." Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 352 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011) ("A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
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works, diminished capacity, pre-sentence rehabilitation, community ties,
family ties, mens rea, and many others.114
4. Collateral Consequences
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the attorney's
responsibility in informing a defendant about the collateral impact of guilty
pleas adds another element. In Padilla, the Court found the failure of
Padilla's lawyer to advise him that his plea would result in a consequence as
severe as his deportation is an omission so gross as to constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel."5 A broader definition of effective counsel should
include collateral and direct consequences that arise in other contexts as
well. Examples include the sentencing ramifications of sex offenses, mental
health adjudications, and department of corrections calculations on parole
and "good time."
V. CONCLUSION
Frye and Lafler announce an important but narrow rule about the right
to effective assistance of counsel in the context of plea bargaining. As such,
the Court missed the opportunity for more meaningful sentencing reform
and regulation of attorney conduct in sentencing negotiations. Attorneys
can't sit on plea offers without communicating those offers to their clients.
Attorneys must not dissuade their clients from accepting "favorable" plea
offers based on faulty or inaccurate advice. In each of these instances, the
harm required by Strickland for a showing of ineffectiveness will be
assessed in the shadow of the missed plea opportunity. But this assessment
of ineffectiveness is unduly narrow for several reasons.
First, in a criminal justice system where the overwhelming number of
cases between ninety and ninety-five percent are resolved in guilty
pleas,"'6 the primary concern is clearly not that too many defense attorneys
are failing to communicate or encourage pleas. The Court's analysis leaves
us no metric for determining when a lawyer has failed in her duties because
she has improvidently recommended a plea, has pressured her client to make
a hasty decision, has failed to investigate mitigating factors regarding the
114. Federal judges are required to state their reasons for a variance or departure in the
Judgment in a Criminal Case (Statement of Reasons) form. This form catalogs possible bases
for departure. See JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE, U.S. COURTS, FORM No. AO 245SOR,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao245sor.pdf.
115. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2010).
116. Id. at 372.
2017] 485
19
Etienne: A Lost Opportunity for Sentencing Reform: Plea Bargaining and Bar
Published by Scholar Commons,
486 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68: 467
offense or offender, or has not adequately alerted her client to collateral
consequences of a plea.
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